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NOTES
MICHAEL H. v. GERALD D.: THE PRESUMPTION
OF PATERNITY
Despite the availability of blood tests that can establish biological pater-
nity with a high degree of certitude,' many states2 continue to enforce stat-
utes imposing limitations on rebuttal of the marital presumption.' Those
statutes are aimed at furthering policies derived from common law,4 and
seek both to decrease the number of children declared "illegitimate" and to
1. See Motulsky, Medical Genetics, 261 J. A.M.A. 2855, 2855 (1989) (stating that
"[p]aternity determination - already much improved by use of HLA typing - can now be
made virtually certain by using DNA markers"); Shaw, Paternity Determinatio; 1921 to 1983
and Beyond, 250 J. A.M.A. 2536, 2536-37 (1983). HLA typing is commonly used by putative
fathers seeking to assert paternity. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2337
(1989) (blood tests could show with 98.07% probability that the appellant was the child's
father).
2. Seventeen states have adopted some form of the Uniform Parentage Act, 9B U.L.A.
287, 287 (1987 & Supp. 1990), which limits rebuttal of the marital presumption. These states
are: Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyo-
ming. Id California makes the marital presumption conclusive by slightly modifying the ver-
sion presented in the Uniform Parentage Act. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004 (West Supp. 1990)
and CAL. EvID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1990); see also infra notes 54-55 and accompanying
text (noting California's modification of the Uniform Parentage Act). See generally Note, Re-
butting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 369, 374-
75 (1988) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act's marital presumption which, if adopted
without modification, is irrebuttable by putative fathers). Some states that have not adopted
the Uniform Parentage Act enforce the marital presumption as well. See, e.g., P.B.C. v.D.H.,
396 Mass. 68, 483 N.E.2d 1094 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986).
3. The marital presumption is a rule of law stating that the issue of a married woman
cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is the product of their marriage.
Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2340 (discussing California's conclusive marital presumption); see
also CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a); infra text accompanying notes 49-55.
4. See 109 S. Ct. at 2342 (citing H. NICHOLAS, ADULTURINE BASTARDY 1 (1836)).
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preserve order within families.' Increasingly, however, unwed fathers6 are
challenging the constitutionality of these statutes.7
Unwed fathers view the laws governing their paternal rights with uncer-
tainty. In considering the unwed father's legal rights, no concrete rules or
precedents exist. In four separate cases, the United States Supreme Court
has decided whether an unwed father has a right to maintain a relationship
with his children based on the unique facts of each case,9 leaving courts to
speculate as to the definitive rules encompassing these situations. In the
cases considered by the Supreme Court, one putative father lived in a nu-
clear family setting with his children for eighteen years,1° one putative father
lived with and supported his children for only two years,11 and the other
unwed fathers failed altogether to establish substantial relationships with
their children.' 2 None of the fact patterns in these cases implicated the mar-
ital presumption issue.' 3 Thus, the Supreme Court did not consider the ef-
fect of the marital presumption on unwed fathers' rights until Michael H. v.
Gerald D 4
5. Id. at 2343 (citing M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 201 (1985); J.
SCHOULER, LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 225, at 306-07 (3d ed. 1882)).
6. As used in this Note, an unwed father refers to a biological father who is not married
to the child's mother. A putative father is the alleged father of an illegitimate child. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1113 (5th ed. 1979); see also Comment, The Child with Two Fathers: Up-
dating the Wisdom of Solomon, 46 LA. L. REv. 1211, 1212 n.8 (1986). Note that an unwed
father is not a putative father where his child is the result of a married woman's extramarital
affair. In this instance, the child is presumed to be the legitimate issue of the mother and her
husband. Id.
7. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989); Exparte Presse, 554 So. 2d
406 (Ala. 1989); Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619, 179 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1981), appeal
dismissed, 459 U.S. 807 (1982); R. McG. v. J.W., 200 Colo. 345, 615 P.2d 666 (1980); Peti-
tioner F. v. Respondent R., 430 A.2d 1085 (Del. 1981); Happel v. Mecklenburger, 101 Ill.
App. 3d 107, 427 N.E.2d 974 (1981); Finnerty v. Boyett, 469 So. 2d 287 (La. Ct. App. 1985);
P.B.C. v. D.H., 396 Mass. 68, 483 N.E.2d 1094 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986);
State v. White, 300 N.C. 494, 268 S.E.2d 481 (1980); A v. X, 641 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982).
8. See Wadlington, Prologue, The Parent-Child Relationship and the Current Cycle of
Family Law Reform, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 307, 307-09 (1984) (pointing out that hasty statutory
changes in domestic relations laws as well as court decisions having impact in unanticipated
areas have contributed to the present state of confusion surrounding unwed fathers' legal
rights).
9. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
10. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
11. Caban, 441 U.S. at 382.
12. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 252; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247, 251.
13. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250 (the mother was unmarried at the time of the child's birth);
Caban, 441 U.S. at 382 (same); Quilloin 434 U.S. at 247 (same); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646
(same).
14. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
[Vol. 39:831
The Presumption of Legitimacy
In Michael H., the United States Supreme Court addressed the marital
presumption issue in the context of considering the extent of an unwed fa-
ther's right to maintain a relationship with his child. The Court confronted
a unique fact pattern which triggered the presumption. 5 As a result of an
extramarital affair, Carole D. gave birth to Victoria D. 6 Throughout the
first three years of her ife, Victoria D. lived with her mother. Three differ-
ent men lived with her mother during this period.17 Victoria D. spent less
than half of her first three years living with Gerald D., her mother's husband
and Victoria's legal father,"8 and approximately the same amount of time
living with her biological father. 9
When Victoria D. was three years old, her legal parents reconciled, form-
ing a permanent unitary family.20 Nevertheless, Michael H., the child's bio-
logical father, wished to maintain his relationship with Victoria D.2
Because Carole D. and Gerald D. would not allow the biological father to
visit Victoria D., Michael H. attempted to establish his paternity and right to
visitation by filing a filiation action, a means of establishing paternity of a
child which is typically used to compel the father of a child born out of
wedlock to contribute to the child's support.22 Pursuant to section 621 of
the California Evidence Code,23 however, which incorporates the marital
presumption, the California Superior Court did not permit Michael H. to
prove his paternity of Victoria D., and denied Michael H.'s request for con-
tinued visitation privileges under section 4601 of the California Civil Code.24
On appeal, Michael H. argued that application of section 621 of the Cali-
fornia Evidence Code violated his procedural and substantive due process
rights.25 Victoria D., through her guardian ad litem, also challenged the
statute, asserting denial of her due process and equal protection rights.
2 6
15. kl at 2337.
16. Id
17. Id
18. Id Gerald is presumed by law to be Victoria's father even though he may not be her
biological father. Id at 2338.
19. Id. at 2337. Victoria D. also spent several months living with another man involved
with her mother. Id.
20. Id At the time of this suit, Victoria D. lived in New York with Gerald D. and Carole
D. Gerald D., and Carole D. had two other children born after Victoria D. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id
23. CAL. EvID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1990); see infra note 54.
24. 109 S. Ct. at 2338. Section 4601 allows a court to grant, in its discretion, "reasonable
visitation rights ... to any ... person having an interest in the welfare of the child." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4601 (West 1983).
25. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1008-10, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810, 817-19
(1987), aff'd 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
26. Id
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Relying on precedent holding that the conclusive marital presumption of
section 621 precludes any triable issues of fact as to the paternity of a child
born to a married couple," the California Court of Appeal affirmed the su-
perior court's decision." The California Supreme Court denied review of
the case, and the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to
decide whether section 621 of the California Evidence Code denied unwed
fathers or their children due process or equal protection under the
Constitution.29
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute in a plural-
ity opinion written by Justice Scalia.3" The plurality refused to recognize a
traditionally protected liberty interest in maintaining a relationship between
a biological father and a child presumptively the daughter of another man.3
Rather, the Court deferred to the legislature to decide whether an unwed
father could rebut the marital presumption.32 Concurring in all but one
footnote of Justice Scalia's opinion, Justice O'Connor refuted the plurality's
method of looking to the interest of an adulterous natural father, rather than
the more general interest of parenthood, in determining whether our society
traditionally has protected that interest.33
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens disagreed with the plurality's
analysis of the California statute's constitutionality. Justice Stevens did not
reject the possibility of a constitutionally protected interest in the relation-
ship between a natural father and his child, even where the child's mother
was married to another man when the child was born.34 Justice Stevens
found, however, that because California law permitted Michael H. the op-
portunity to convince a trial judge that allowing visitation would be in Victo-
ria D.'s best interests, the California statutes implicitly recognized a
biological father's liberty interest and worked to protect such an interest.
35
27. Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619, 623-24, 179 Cal. Rptr. 9, 10-11 (1981),
appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 807 (1982).
28. Michael H., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1013, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
29. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 485 U.S. 903 (1988). The Court did not reach Michael H.'s
equal protection claim because it was not raised below. Michael H. 109 S. Ct. at 2338.
30. MichaelH., 109 S. Ct. at 2341. The Court was divided with five Justices concurring in
the judgment and four Justices dissenting. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, filed an
opinion concurring in part, and Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, and
Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Brennan.
31. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 168-69, 185-89, 231-32.
32. Id. at 2345.
33. Id. at 2346-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 2347 (Stevens, J., concurring).
35. Id.
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Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that the California statutes operated in con-
formity with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.36
In his dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the plurality for depending too
heavily on a rigid interpretation of "tradition., 37 Justice Brennan main-
tained that the plurality's objective definition of tradition consisted of entries
in "dusty volumes on American history"'3' and was incomplete. Further,
Justice Brennan argued that, even if the plurality could accurately identify
the content of specific operable traditions, in this case tradition was irrele-
vant and should not be the cornerstone of the plurality's analysis.39 There-
fore, the dissent would have limited the role of tradition, recognizing that
experience shapes constitutional concepts." In a separate dissent, Justice
White intimated that sociological changes made reliance on history and past
traditions irrelevant to the case.4 Thus, Justice White asserted that Michael
H. established a liberty interest mandating constitutional protection by de-
veloping a substantial relationship with Victoria D.42
This Note analyzes the development of the Court's guidelines for deter-
mining whether an unwed father can claim a constitutionally protected in-
terest in maintaining a relationship with his child. The Note first presents
the legislative and judicial development of the presumption of paternity,
tracing the evolution of the substantial relationship test and the best interests
standard implemented by the Court. This Note then discusses the influence
of the peculiar facts of prior cases in applying these guidelines. Further, this
Note addresses the United States Supreme Court's decision in Michael H. v.
Gerald D., focusing on the contrasting views presented in the case. Ulti-
mately, this Note concludes that the Michael H. plurality failed to adhere to
previously established guidelines for determining the extent of an unwed fa-
ther's parental rights. In the absence of definitive boundaries, the Court
should provide an unwed father with the opportunity to demonstrate that he
established, or earnestly attempted to establish, a substantial relationship
with his child before adopting a bright line rule that the best interests of a
36. Id. at 2348-49.
37. Id. at 2349 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that "this concept can
be as malleable and as elusive as 'liberty' itself [and thus tradition cannot place] a discernible
border around the Constitution." Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2350.
41. Id at 2362 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White saw "no reason to debate ... ancient
policy concerns behind bastardy laws," asserting that "[i]t is hardly rare in this world of di-
vorce and remarriage for a child to live with the 'father' to whom her mother is married, and
still have a relationship with her biological father." Id.
42. Id. at 2361.
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child are served by discontinuing contact between the child and the unwed
father.
I. THE CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY: A SUBSTANTIVE
RULE OF LAW
In response to the need for new legislation eliminating the legal differenti-
ation between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" children, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform
Parentage Act.43 The Act attempts to promote the goal of "equalizing the
substantive legal position of the illegitimate child with that of the legitimate
child"" by seeking to identify a parent against whom the child may assert
his legal rights.45 In situations where external circumstances, such as mar-
riage, implicate a particular man as a child's father, the Uniform Parentage
Act incorporates the presumption of paternity.' The presumption of pater-
nity, while saving the state's resources,47 can effectively ignore the parental
claims asserted by a natural father who is not recognized by the statute.48
The Uniform Parentage Act bases its presumptions of parenthood on state
laws.49 Section 4 of the Act catalogs circumstances triggering the presump-
tion of paternity. 0 The presumption under section 4 "may be rebutted in an
appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence."5" California,
which was among the first states to adopt the Act,52 maintains a conclusive
43. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 1-30, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1973).
44. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 287, 289 (1987) (prefatory note).
45. Id. By identifying a parent against whom to demand support, the State relieves itself
of a fiscal burden in many cases where single parents turn to government assistance programs
for child support. Id.
46. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4.
47. "Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determi-
nation." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972).
48. Id. at 657-58.
49. UNIF. PARENTAGE AT, 9B U.L.A. at 289 (prefatory note).
50. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4. Circumstances which trigger the presumption include:
Marriage between the presumed father and the mother at the time of the child's birth; or, if the
marriage has terminated, termination of the marriage no more than 300 days prior to the
child's birth; or, if the parents are unmarried at the time of the child's birth, the marriage or
attempted marriage of the presumed father and the mother after the child's birth and the
father's acknowledgement of paternity. Id. The presumed father can also trigger the marital
presumption by receiving the child into his home and openly holding out the child as his own,
or by filing an acknowledgement of his paternity undisputed by the mother. Id. Only one
father, however, may trigger the marital presumption. Therefore, a biological father who
openly holds out a child as his own does not benefit from the marital presumption if the child's
mother is married to another man at the time of the child's birth.
51. Id. §4(b).
52. CAL. STAT. 3196 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7018 (West 1983
& Supp. 1990) (effective Jan. 1, 1976)).
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presumption of legitimacy53 for children born into a marriage.5 4 Section 621
of the California Evidence Code, which codifies the marital presumption,
remains effective as an additional condition activating the presumption of
paternity under California law."
Although the California marital presumption statute dates back to 1872,56
before the advent of blood tests that could determine parenthood with a high
degree of accuracy,57 section 621 of the Evidence Code remains good law
with few substantive changes.5" The conclusive presumption of the Califor-
nia statute affords the unwed father no opportunity to challenge the accu-
racy of the legal determination that a mother's husband is the father of her
child. Therefore, unless the mother or her husband seeks to rebut the mari-
53. On adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act, the California legislature amended its
code, replacing the word "legitimate" with "child of the marriage". 1975 CAL. STAT. 3202
(codified as amended at CAL. EvID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1990)).
54. Section 621 of the California Evidence Code provides:
Child of the marriage; notice of motion for blood tests
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the issue of a wife cohabiting with her
husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the
marriage.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a), if the court finds that the
conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon blood tests
performed pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 890) of Division 7 are
that the husband is not the father of the child, the question of paternity of the hus-
band shall be resolved accordingly.
(c) The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be raised by the
husband not later than two years from the child's date of birth.
(d) The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be raised by the
mother of the child not later than two years from the child's date of birth if the
child's biological father has fied an affidavit with the court acknowledging paternity
of the child.
(e) The provisions of subdivision (b) shall not apply to any case coming within the
provisions of Section 7005 of the Civil Code or to any case in which the wife, with the
consent of the husband, conceived by means of a surgical procedure.
Id
55. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 4 with CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004 (California adds
the phrase "if he meets the conditions as set forth in Section 621 of the Evidence Code" to the
list of conditions activating the presumption of paternity).
56. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1990) (originally enacted at CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 1962 (5) (1872)). For a discussion of the history of the statute, see Comment, Presumptions
of Legitimacy and Related Problems, 23 S. CAL. L. REv. 538, 539 n.5, 550 (1950).
57. See supra note 1.
58. The California legislature adopted only two substantive changes over the last century
relating to blood testing. A 1980 amendment allowed the admission of blood test evidence by
the husband in order to rebut the marital presumption. 1980 CAL. STAT. 4433 (codified as
amended at CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1990)). A 1981 amendment expanded the
1980 amendment by permitting a mother to rebut the marital presumption by introducing
blood test evidence. 1981 CAL. STAT. 4760 (codified as amended at CAL. EVID. CODE § 621
(West Supp. 1990)). Neither amendment, however, permits the unwed father to rebut the
presumption with scientific evidence.
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tal presumption, an unwed father cannot claim paternity, and cannot obtain
any parental rights with respect to his natural child.
II. JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PATERNITY: THE SUBSTANTIAL
RELATIONSHIP TEST
A. Development of a Substantial Relationship
The Supreme Court fails to recognize as constitutionally protected the bi-
ological relationship between an unwed father and his child.59 Rather, when
determining the scope of the unwed father's parental rights, the biological
connection merely serves as a starting point.' ° The Court considers the fac-
tors which tend to show a commitment to the biological connection more
important than the biological connection itself.61 Therefore, the Court will
consider factors such as financial support, emotional attachment, personal
contact, and participation in rearing, which, when taken in combination
with the biological connection, will contribute to the interest in a substantial
relationship recognized by the Supreme Court.62
The precise parameters of the relationship between a biological father and
a child vary with each case, and circumstantial differences necessarily affect
the case's outcome.63 The degree of protection that the Court affords to an
59. "Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between par-
ent and child. They require relationships more enduring." Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983)
(stating that "the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional
protection"). Obviously, there are situations in which there exists a biological connection that
does not, and should not, give rise to a constitutionally protected relationship. Examples are
scenarios involving rape or artificial insemination. The Uniform Parentage Act addresses the
issue of artificial insemination, providing that "[t]he donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived." UNIF. PAR-
ENTAGE AcT § 5 (1973) (emphasis added); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1983) (California
omits the word "married" preceeding "woman"); see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West
Supp. 1990) (excepting from the marital presumption "any case in which the wife, with the
consent of the husband, conceived by means of a surgical procedure").
60. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring.
If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the
child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make
uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development.
Id.
61. See id. at 261.
62. Id. at 258-62.
63. See Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619, 627, 179 Cal. Rptr. 9, 13 (1981)
(pointing out that "each case must be decided upon its own facts"), appeal dismissed 459 U.S.
807 (1982).
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unwed father's relationship with his child varies with the weight of factors
that the father can prove tending to show a commitment to the biological
connection. 4 The strongest indication of a substantially developed relation-
ship is a nuclear family arrangement.65 A nuclear family encompasses each
of the important aspects of a substantial relationship.66 For example, a nu-
clear family arrangement gives rise to continuous association between parent
and child. This continuity of personal contact promotes emotional attach-
ment and active participation, both personal and financial, in the child's de-
velopment.67  Accordingly, the Supreme Court indicated in Stanley v.
Illinois an increased willingness to recognize a parental interest if the biologi-
cal father can prove the presence of a nuclear family relationship.6"
In Stanley, the unwed father lived with his children and their mother in-
termittently as a unitary family.69 Upon the death of their mother, the State
of Illinois declared the children wards of the state pursuant to a state stat-
ute,70 and, without a hearing, placed them with court-appointed guardi-
ans.7" Illinois law prohibited the taking of children from married parents or
unwed mothers, however, absent a showing that they were unfit parents.72
Consequently, Stanley argued that the statute deprived him of his fourteenth
amendment due process and equal protection rights.73 Stanley contended
that his private interest in maintaining a relationship with his children was a
central element of his due process right.74
Holding that an unwed father is entitled to a hearing on his fitness prior to
having his children taken from him by the state,75 the Supreme Court recog-
64. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-62 & n.18.
65. Members of a nuclear family include the father, the mother, and their children all
sharing one home. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977).
66. See supra text accompanying note 62.
67. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-62.
68. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). Justice White, writing for the majority, noted, "[t]he pri-
vate interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Id.
69. Id at 646.
70. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 702-5 (1972) (repealed 1988) (describing a depen-
dent minor as "any minor under 18 years of age.., who is without a parent, guardian or legal
custodian"); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701-14 (1980) (repealed 1988) (stating that
"'[p]arents' means the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the
natural mother of an illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive parent;" note that unwed
fathers are not included in this definition).
71. The state asserted "that unwed fathers are presumed unfit to raise their children and
... it is unnecessary to hold individualized hearings to determine whether particular fathers
are in fact unfit parents before they are separated from their children." 405 U.S. at 647.
72. Id. at 646.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 650-51.
75. Id. at 658.
1990]
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nized Stanley's relationship with his children as constituting a "family" de-
spite Stanley's single status.76 According to the Court, the substantial
relationship between the biological father and his children did not depend
solely upon the natural parents' marital relationship. While the Court rec-
ognized the existence of a substantial relationship under the facts and cir-
cumstances of Stanley, however, the Court failed to delineate explicit
guidelines for determining the outcome of future cases. 7
In Caban v. Mohammed,78 the Court again considered the parameters of a
substantial relationship in determining the rights of an unwed father. In
Caban, the unwed father lived with and contributed to the support of his
children until they were ages two and four.7 9 Subsequently, the mother left
Caban, taking the children and marrying another man.8 ° Nevertheless, after
the separation, Caban continued to visit the children, and on one occasion
attempted to retain custody of them.81
When the children's mother and stepfather filed for adoption, Caban and
his wife cross petitioned for adoption. 2 The Supreme Court rejected appli-
cation of a New York statute that allowed an unwed mother, but not an
unwed father, to oppose the adoption of the child.8 3 Although the Court
declined to reach the issue of whether natural fathers possess a "due process
right ... to maintain a parental relationship with their children absent a
finding that they are unfit as parents," 4 the Court recognized Caban's rela-
tionship with his children as being "substantial." 5 The Court, while not
identifying discernible boundaries to the "substantial relationship" test,
76. Id. at 651. Justice White explained the result stating, "[n]or has the law refused to
recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony." Id
77. See id. at 652.
78. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
79. Id. at 382.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 382-83. Caban visited the children while they were staying with their maternal
grandmother in Puerto Rico. Rather than returning the children to their grandmother after a
few days as expected, Caban brought the children back to New York with him. After a failed
attempt to retrieve the children with the help of a police officer, the children's mother insti-
tuted custody proceedings, and later, with her husband, filed for adoption of the children. Id.
82. Id at 383. Under New York law, a child born out of wedlock may be adopted by his
or her natural parent and stepparent. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1988).
83. 441 U.S. at 394. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 stated that prior to adoption of a child
born out of wedlock, consent is required from "the parents or surviving parent, whether adult
or infant, of a child born in wedlock ... [or] the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child
born out of wedlock." 1976 N.Y. Laws 1405 (current version as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 111 (McKinney 1988)). Consent of the unwed father was not necessary.
84. Id. at 385.
85. Id. at 386-87. The Court concluded that the statute was invalid on the basis of
Caban's equal protection claim. Id. at 388, 394.
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broadened the test's applicability to circumstances where the biological fa-
ther can show the former presence of a nuclear family relationship.
In Quilloin v. Walcott, 86 the Court further exemplified the importance of
the familial bond between unwed fathers and their illegitimate children.
Quilloin involved a statute similar to the statute questioned in Caban. 7 The
Georgia statute required the written consent of both parents before approv-
ing the adoption of a child born in wedlock unless a parent abandoned the
child, surrendered rights in the child, was adjudicated unfit, or could not be
found."8 Conversely, the consent of the unwed father was unnecessary prior
to adoption of an illegitimate child. 9 In Quilloin, the unwed father argued
that application of the Georgia statute denied the natural father of an illegiti-
mate child the ability to prevent the mother's husband from adopting the
child. 9°
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as
applied to the unwed father in Quilloin.9" To merit constitutional protec-
tion, the Court required a familial bond supported by a financial commit-
ment or a shared household such as the one recognized in Caban.92 Because
the unwed father in Quilloin "never shouldered any significant responsibility
with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the
child," the Court determined that the father had failed to establish a sub-
stantial relationship with the child.93
B. Difficulties in Establishing a Substantial Relationship
In Stanley, Caban, and Quilloin, the Court alluded to what it considered
the factors necessary to form a substantial relationship between a putative
father and an illegitimate child. The Supreme Court required financial sup-
port or custodial attachment to secure the protection of the relationship
86. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
87. Id. at 248. The statute provided that, prior to adoption, "[i]f the child be illegitimate,
the consent of the mother alone shall suffice." 1941 Ga. Laws 300, 301 (current version at GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-8-3 (1982) (containing no special provisions for the adoption of illegitimate
children)). Cf N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (similarly requiring only the mother's consent);
see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
88. 1941 Ga. Laws 300 (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-3 (1982)).
89. Id.
90. 434 U.S. at 255-56.
91. Id. at 256.
92. Id at 251, 256. Where the unwed father did not live with or support the child, the
Court relied on the "best interests" standard which considered the effect of a continued rela-
tionship on the child above the interest of the unwed father. See id. at 251, 255; see also infra
text accompanying notes 122-29.
93. 434 U.S. at 256.
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under the Constitution.94 Until Lehr v. Robertson," however, the Court had
not addressed the possibility of the mother's intervention preventing the un-
wed father from establishing such a relationship.96
In Lehr, the unwed father lived with the child's mother before the child's
birth.97 After the hospital discharged the mother and newborn from its care,
the mother failed to return to the unwed father and would not disclose her
whereabouts to him.9" In addition, the biological father did not receive ad-
vance notice of the child's adoption by*the mother's new husband.99 Never-
theless, the Court failed to recognize the unwed father's parental rights, and
upheld the adoption order.
°o°
Reaffirming its position requiring the demonstration of a substantial rela-
tionship between the unwed father and his child as a condition to constitu-
tional protection, the Supreme Court in Lehr ignored the biological father's
protestations that he was prohibited from establishing such a relationship
with his daughter.'0° The Court's decision in Lehr implied that the feasibil-
ity of the putative father's development a substantial relationship with his
child was irrelevant to the consideration of his claim to parental rights.102
C. Challenges to the Substantial Relationship Test
1. The Unwed Father's Equal Protection Claim
Unwed fathers commonly attack statutes limiting their parental rights on
equal protection grounds.10 3 The success of an unwed father's equal protec-
94. See supra text accompanying notes 59-93.
95. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
96. See id at 270-71 (White, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 252 (majority opinion).
98. Id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 250 (majority opinion).
100. Id. at 265-68.
101. Id at 262. Justice White criticized the majority for omitting consideration of this
aspect of the circumstances. Id. at 271 (White, J., dissenting).
102. Id at 250-51 (majority opinion). The Court drew attention away from the importance
of Lehr's difficulty in establishing a relationship with his child, finding that the unwed father
could have used other channels open to him to insure minimum due process protection. For
example, by registering in the "putative father registry," he would have secured notice of any
adoption proceedings. Id. at 263-65; see also N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 372-c (McKinney 1988)
(establishing a putative registry for unwed fathers to record notice of intent to claim a child
born out-of-wedlock).
103. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (where an unwed father attacked
the constitutionality of a Georgia statute requiring consent from married parents or unwed
mothers prior to adoption of their child, but not requiring consent of an unwed father). The
court in Michael H declined to reach Michael H.'s equal protection claim because he failed to
raise it in the court below. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2338 (1989).
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tion claim hinges first on proof of biological paternity,""° and second on con-
firmation of a substantial relationship with the child."' 5 Given the
opportunity to present medical evidence, an unwed father can accurately
prove paternity.I"' Unlike an unwed mother or a married parent, however,
the unwed father must also convince the Court that he has developed a sub-
stantial relationship with his child.107
Absent a showing of a substantial relationship, the Court does not con-
sider the unwed father "similarly situated" with the mother because the
mother maintains custodial responsibility for the child.'08 The Court recog-
nizes a distinction between the unwed father and the unwed mother on the
basis of the mother's additional responsibilities. Therefore, without a show-
ing of a substantial relationship, the unwed father's equal protection claim
will fail.I°9 Similarly, an unwed father's claim asserting denial of equal pro-
tection where a statute treats unwed fathers and married parents differently
fails where the unwed father cannot show a substantial relationship.I"0 The
Court distinguishes the interests of a married parent responsible for the sup-
port of a child from the interests of an unwed father who has not provided
any support or assumed any responsibility for the rearing of the child.,',
104. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393 n.15 (1979).
105. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250, 269 (1983) (the mother prohibited the
biological father from establishing a substantial relationship with his child); Caban, 441 U.S.
380, 386-87 (the biological father established a substantial relationship with his children by
living with and supporting them until they were ages two and four); Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256
(the biological father failed to establish a substantial relationship with his child through occa-
sional visits); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (the biological father established a
substantial relationship with his children by living with them in a nuclear family setting).
106. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Quiloin, 434 U.S. at 256 (distinguishing between parental rights of married
and unwed fathers). Statutes operate to presume a parental relationship between a natural
mother and child where the mother can prove that she gave birth to the child, and between a
father and child where the father can prove that he was married to the mother at the time of
the child's birth. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 3-4(a)(1) (1973). The statutes do not,
however, require showing of a substantial relationship in these cases.
108. Compare Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267 (where the biological father had not participated in the
rearing of his child) with Caban 441 U.S. at 392-93 (where the biological father lived with his
children for several years). "An unwed father who has not come forward and who has estab-
lished no relationship with the child is plainly not in a situation similar to the mother's."
Caban, 441 U.S. at 399 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Note, supra note 2, at 379-82 (discuss-
ing the gender-based classification of marital presumption statutes).
109. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68. "If one parent has an established custodial rela-
tionship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned or never established a rela-
tionship, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a State from according the two parents
different legal rights." Id. (footnotes omitted).
110. See Quilloin. 434 U.S. at 255-56.
111. Id
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Consequently, a substantial relationship with the child is essential to an un-
wed father's equal protection claim.
112
2. The Unwed Father's Due Process Claim
The Supreme Court identified the elements to be used in a due process
analysis in Mathews v. Eldridge. I I3 The Court explained that an individual's
private interest must be weighed against countervailing interests in deter-
mining the extent of process due.114 Applying this analysis in the context of
an unwed father, in order to secure protection under the due process clause,
a putative father must show not only a sense of parental responsibility by
forming a substantial relationship with his child,115 but also that his interest
in maintaining that relationship outweighs any competing interests.116 In
particular, the Court considers the child's best interests, 117 the interests of
the marital family,"'5 and the state's interests when assessing the due process
protection afforded to a father in preserving his personal contacts with a
child." 9 The Court has stated, however, that the protection provided to
further the best interests of the child will outweigh an unwed father's due
process protection where such interests conflict. 120
a The Best Interests of the Child Standard
Where putative fathers assert paternal rights, the Court considers the
"best interests of the child" paramount.1 2' The difficulty for the Court
112. See Caban, 441 U.S. at 386-87 (the demonstration of a substantial relationship per-
suaded the Court to find in favor of the biological father); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972) (same).
113. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The factors to be considered were:
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
Id at 335.
114. Id. at 334.
115. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256-57 (1983).
116. Id. at 258.60. The interest of a natural father in personal contacts with his child is
deserving of "substantial protection under the Due Process Clause." Id. at 261.
117. See, e.g., id. at 257.
118. See, e.g., id. at 258.
119. See, e.g., id. at 266; see also infra text accompanying notes 137-45.
120. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260-62 & n.16.
121. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254 (1978). Lower courts have also ap-
plied the best interests standard. See, e.g., Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 619, 624, 179
Cal. Rptr. 9, 11 (1981), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 807 (1982).
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arises in defining a child's best interests and in deciding who determines
them.
In Quilloin v. Walcott, the Court utilized the "best interests of the child"
standard.12 2 In Quilloin, the Court deferred to the mother's opinion in de-
ciding what was best for the child.123 The mother neither married, nor lived
with, the putative father.124 When the child was almost three years old, the
mother married another man. 125 When the husband filed a petition for
adoption eight years later, the putative father objected. 126 Affirming the
adoption, the Court considered the trial court's findings that the putative
father visited the child and gave the child occasional gifts, but failed to pro-
vide support for the child on a regular basis. 2" Although the child ex-
pressed a desire to continue visiting his putative father, the mother alleged
that the visits were having a "disruptive effect" on the child.1 28 Conse-
quently, the Court denied further visitation rights to the putative father. 129
In evaluating the best interests of an illegitimate child, the Supreme Court
consistently has used criteria that include the existence of a substantial rela-
tionship between the child and the putative father, 3° and the possibility of
competing relationships that would conflict with the continuation of the pu-
tative father-child association.131 The Court, however, has neither clearly
defined these criteria nor identified the relative weight accorded to them.
132
The Quilloin holding, while not settling the ongoing debate on defining best
interests, provided some workable guidelines for future courts' determina-
tion of those interests.1
33
122. 434 U.S. at 254.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 247.
125. Id
126. Id
127. See supra text accompanying note 94.
128. 434 U.S. at 251 & n. 11. The mother and her husband had another child, and the
mother testified that the putative father's contacts with his illegitimate child were disturbing
for both children. Id at 251 n.10.
129. Id at 251, 256.
130. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-67 (1983).
131. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
132. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266-67.
133. 434 U.S. at 254-56. Although courts have used the best interests standard in other
cases involving assertions of paternal rights by putative fathers, they have shed little additional
instructive light on how to apply the standard. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266-67 (relying on,
but not adding to, the Quiiloin best interests standard); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
386-87 (1979) (requiring the unwed father to show that adoption by the mother's husband
would not be in the child's best interests); In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 648-51, 532 P.2d 123,
131-33, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475, 483-85 (weighing private interests against state interests, but failing
to shed additional light on the best interest standard), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1014 (1975);
Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619, 627-28, 179 Cal. Rptr. 9, 13 (1981) (stating that
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The Quilloin Court identified two elements as relevant in determining the
best interests of a child. First, without providing a rationale, the Court sanc-
tioned giving considerable weight to the mother's opinion. 34 Second, the
Quilloin Court maintained that being legitimized by adoption into an already
existing family unit, particularly when all parties except the putative father
desire the adoption, serves the best interests of an illegitimate child. ' 35 The
Court based this assertion on the putative father's irregular support of the
child in contrast with the stable homelife the child's mother provided.
36
Thus, the Court's assessment of the child's best interests focused on securing
the most appropriate familial setting for raising the child, and permitted the
mother's opinion to play a decisive role in that determination.
b. Other Interested Parties
While the Court considers the best interests of the child foremost, the
Court accords due weight to interests of other parties in conflict with those
of a putative father.' 37 Specifically, the Supreme Court acknowledges a state
interest in facilitating the adoption of illegitimate children. 3 ' Adoption of
illegitimate children by responsible families often lifts the financial burden of
child support from the state. 3  Equally important, most states possess an
interest in protecting "the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare"
of a minor, and in protecting the best interests of the community."' Typi-
cally, courts consider illegitimacy contrary to the states' interests, and thus
courts favor adoption by a stepparent to legitimize a child over continuation
of a natural father's visitation rights."'
Likewise, courts have recognized that a child's mother has an interest in
maintaining a stable environment for the child. Visits from the child's bio-
logical father may disrupt an established family unit.'42 In addition, courts
"court-ordered visitation would be detrimental to the best interests of the child"), appeal dis-
missed, 459 U.S. 807 (1982).
134. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 251.
135. Id. at 251, 254; see also Vincent B, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 624, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 11
(stressing the detrimental effect of the social stigma of illegitimacy on a child).
136. 434 U.S. at 251, 255.
137. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266-69 (upholding a statute intended to "protect the rights
of interested third parties" as well as to "promote the best interests of the child").
138. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979).
139. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2343 (1989) (noting that at common
law, a primary reason for recognizing the marital presumption was an aversion to declaring
illegitimate children wards of the state).
140. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701-
2 (1972)).
141. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126
Cal. App. 3d 619, 627, 179 Cal. Rptr. 9, 13 (1981), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 807 (1982).
142. See, e.g., Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 251 & n.10.
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are aware that contacts between the illegitimate child and the putative father
might cause animosity among other children in the family143 and possibly
strain the relationship between the mother and her spouse.'44 Consequently,
uncoupling the private interests of the child's mother and the interests of the
state appears difficult when determining the best interests of the child.145
Although the Supreme Court acknowledges the right of an unwed father
to continue a substantially developed relationship with his child if it furthers
the child's best interests, the Court declines to recognize the relationship as
requiring greater protection than the interests of other parties involved.'"
When a child is born to a married woman, the marital presumption protects
the interests of the married couple by presuming that the child is the product
of that union.147 This presumption, however, operates to deny parental
rights to the unwed father of a child born into another marital family. In
Michael H. v. Gerald D., an unwed father seeking parental rights over a child
born into an existant marital union challenged the constitutionality of the
marital presumption. 148
III. MICHAEL H. v. GERALD D.: THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGrIMACY
Michael H. v. Gerald D. 49 presented the Supreme Court with a new di-
mension to the problem of determining the extent of an unwed father's pa-
ternal rights. The unwed father, Michael H., had an adulterous affair with
Carole D. that continued intermittently for six years.' 5° Carole D. gave
birth to a daughter, Victoria D., during the time of her involvement with
Michael H., and blood tests confirmed with ninety-eight percent certainty
that Michael H. fathered the child.' 5 ' Carole D. and Victoria D. periodi-
cally lived with Michael H. during the first three years of Victoria D.'s life,
and Michael H. held the child out as his own.' 52 Nevertheless, when Carole
D. reconciled with her husband, Gerald D., establishing a permanent home
with him, she prevented Michael H. from maintaining a relationship with
Victoria D.- Although Michael H. filed a filiation action in the California
143. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
144. See Comment, supra note 6, at 1226 (noting that visits from the unwed father can
create tension between the child's mother and her husband).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 137-44.
146. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2345 (1989).
147. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
148. 109 S. Ct. at 2336-37.
149. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
150. IdL at 2337.
151. Id; see also supra note 1.
152. 109 S. Ct. at 2337.
153. Id at 2337-38.
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Superior Court and gained limited visitation privileges, 54 Gerald D. inter-
vened in the suit, citing section 621 of the California Evidence Code, and
asked the court to dismiss Michael H.'s claim.
155
Section 621 of the California Evidence Code presumes that a woman's
husband, if he is not impotent or sterile, is the father of her children.156
Only the mother's husband or, under limited circumstances, the mother of
the child can rebut the marital presumption. 15' Because an unwed father
cannot rebut the presumption, it is difficult for him to maintain a relation-
ship with his child. Therefore, to continue to associate with his children, an
unwed father must gain visitation rights under section 4601 of the California
Civil Code, which allows a court to grant, in its discretion, "reasonable visi-
tation rights.., to any... person having an interest in the welfare of the
child."' 5 1 In MichaelH., the California Superior Court granted Gerald D.'s
motion, disallowing any further visitation between Michael H. and Victoria
D. 159
The presumption of legitimacy, which identified Gerald D. as Victoria's,
father under California law,"6° precluded Michael H. from asserting his pa-
ternity and, consequently, his right to maintain a relationship with his
child. 16' Therefore, Michael H. attacked, on due process grounds, the Cali-
fornia statute162 that endorsed the marital presumption. 63  Specifically,
Michael H. argued that section 621 prevented him from legally establishing
a parental relationship with Victoria D., thereby depriving him of a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest.'64 The California Court of Appeal upheld
the constitutionality of the statute, 65 and following the California Supreme
Court's denial of discretionary review, the United States Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction. 1
66
154. Id. at 2337.
155. Id. at 2337-38.
156. See supra note 54.
157. CAL. EvID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1990).
158. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West Supp. 1990).
159. 109 S. Ct. at 2338.
160. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621.
161. 109 S. Ct. at 2338.
162. CAL. EvID. CODE § 621.
163. 109 S. Ct. at 2338. Victoria D. also challenged the constitutionality of the statute,
claiming that a child has a right to continued contact with her natural father, and thus a right
to rebut the marital presumption. Id.
164. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1008, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810, 817 (1987),
aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
165. Id at 1007-10, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 817-19.
166. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 485 U.S. 903 (1988).
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The United States Supreme Court, in a plurality decision written by Jus-
tice Scalia, upheld the constitutionality of the California statute.'6 7 The plu-
rality concluded that the Constitution traditionally affords no protection to
the relationship between a natural father and his adulterously conceived off-
spring. 6 ' Unable to point to previous cases or sources traditionally recog-
nizing the right of a natural father to continue contact with his adulterously
conceived offspring, Michael H. failed to show that he had a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with Victoria D. 6 9
A. The Plurality's and Concurrences' Rejection of Due Process Challenges
to the Marital Presumption
1. Procedural Due Process
In dismissing the natural father's procedural due process claim,' 7 ° the
plurality declared irrelevant Michael H.'s biological paternity under the Cal-
ifornia statute.' 7' The plurality asserted that California Evidence Code sec-
tion 621 created a conclusive presumption that Victoria D. was the
legitimate offspring of the union between her mother and her mother's hus-
band and, therefore, the natural father lacked standing to claim any parental
rights at all. 172 The Court's reasoning, however, appeared directly contra-
dictory to the Court's earlier holding in Stanley v. Illinois. '7' In Stanley, the
Court specifically addressed the issue of denying a hearing to a putative fa-
167. 109 S. Ct. at 2336-37.
168. Id at 2344. The plurality repeatedly used the word "adulterous" when describing
Michael H.'s position, thereby emphasizing the immorality of Michael H.'s past behavior
throughout the opinion. Justice Brennan noted in his dissent that "no fewer than six times, the
plurality refer(red] to Michael as the adulterous natural father." Id. at 2353 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
169. Id. at 2343-44 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia identified Michael H.'s burden as
establishing that "the power of the natural father to assert parental rights over a child born
into a woman's existing marriage with another man... is so deeply embedded within our
traditions as to be a fundamental right." Id. at 2343. Further, Justice Scalia stated that not
only must Michael H. show that "our society has traditionally allowed a natural father in his
circumstances to establish paternity, but that it has traditionally accorded such a father paren-
tal rights, or at least not traditionally denied them." Id. at 2344.
170. Victoria also posed a due process claim to maintain a relationship with her natural
father. Id at 2346. The Court dismissed this claim as deserving little merit, stating that tradi-
tionally the state has never recognized dual fatherhood as being beneficial for a child. Id.
Victoria also presented an equal protection claim, but the Court rejected it as well, stating that
Victoria was treated in the same manner as other legitimate children in being permitted to
maintain a relationship with her legal father. Id. The Court further determined that allowing
a child to rebut the marital presumption could "well disrupt an otherwise peaceful union." Id
171. Id at 2340 (citing CAL. EvID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1990)).
172. 109 S. Ct. at 2340-41 (plurality opinion).
173. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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ther on the basis of a statutory presumption of unfitness as a parent,174 and
declared the application of the statute that warranted such a result violative
of due process. 175 The plurality reconciled the apparent inconsistency in its
judgment, contending that the Stanley decision was based on substantive,
rather than procedural, due process.
176
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, took issue with the plurality's disposi-
tion of the procedural due process claim.1 77  According to Justice Stevens,
California Evidence Code section 621 did not work as a complete bar to
Michael H.'s ability to continue his relationship with Victoria D. because
section 4601 of the California Civil Code offered an alternative method. 7'
Section 4601 allows the court discretionary power to grant visitation rights
to parties, other than parents, having an interest in the welfare of the
child. 1 79 Justice Stevens reasoned that section 4601 of the California Civil
Code"' granted Michael H. the opportunity to be heard with regard to his
interest in Victoria D.'s welfare, and thereby afforded him his procedural
due process rights.181
Justice Stevens argued that, by reading the California statutes as an abso-
lute bar to a natural father's asserting visitation rights under section 621, the
plurality misinterpreted the plain meaning of the provisions. 8 2 Instead, Jus-
tice Stevens concluded that the statutes demand that the Court address the
separate issue of whether to grant the unwed father visitation rights pursu-
ant to section 4601.183 Using this approach, Justice Stevens asserted that
Michael H.'s claim would fail on substantive, rather than procedural, due
process grounds because it was not in the best interests of the child to allow
visitation. 
8 4
174. Id. at 647; see supra note 71.
175. 405 U.S. at 658. The Court criticized the statute because "[i]t insists on presuming
rather than proving.., solely because it is more convenient to presume than to prove." Id.
The Court continued, "[u]nder the Due Process Clause that advantage is insufficient to justify
refusing a father a hearing when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family." Id.
176. 109 S. Ct at 2340; cf Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649-50, 656-58 (the Stanley Court, conspicu-
ously omitting the word "substantive," required that, as a matter of due process, an unwed
father be granted a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken away from
him).
177. 109 S. Ct. at 2347 (Stevens, J., concurring).
178. Id
179. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4601 (West Supp. 1990). Section 4601 of the California Civil Code
provides, in relevant part: "In the discretion of the court, reasonable visitation rights may be
granted to any other person having an interest in the welfare of the child." Id
180. Id.
181. 109 S. Ct. at 2347-49 (Stevens, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 2347.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2348-49.
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2. Substantive Due Process
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion rejected Michael H.'s substantive due
process claim on two grounds. First, the plurality opinion refused to recog-
nize a constitutionally protected liberty interest in Michael H.'s relationship
with Victoria D. "5 According to Scalia, the relationship between an unwed
father and his child, who was living in another marital family, did not war-
rant special protection "under the historic practices of our society."' 6
Maintaining that an asserted liberty interest must traditionally be recog-
nized, Justice Scalia concluded that Michael H.'s claim of a constitutionally
protected interest in continuing his relationship with Victoria D. must
fail.1' 7 Second, the plurality asserted that, even if the Court recognized such
a liberty interest, the State's interest in terminating the adulterous father-
child relationship would override the unwed father's liberty interest in con-
tinuing the relationship."' 8 Justice Scalia reasoned that the state possessed
the discretionary power to give preference to the interest of the married
couple in preserving the integrity of their nuclear family over the interest of
the unwed father in continuing his relationship with his child."8 9
While concurring in part, Justice O'Connor disagreed with one footnote of
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion."9 In this footnote, Justice Scalia sketched
a method of using historical traditions tailored to the most specific level for
identifying an asserted right. 9 ' Applying this methodology, the plurality
concluded that the Court traditionally did not recognize a constitutionally
protected parent-child relationship between a natural father and a child born
into another marriage.' 92 Justice O'Connor noted that "[o]n occasion the
185. Id. at 2341-42 (plurality opinion).
186. Id. at 2342. In defining Michael H.'s rights, Justice Scalia advocated examining "the
most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the as-
serted right can be identified." Id. at 2344 n.6. In doing this, Justice Scalia rejected the possi-
bility of recognizing Michael H.'s rights in the more general category of "parenthood." Id
Rather, Justice Scalia opted to categorize Michael H.'s rights as "the rights of the natural
father of a child adulterously conceived." Id. Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia was then unable
to find prior cases or historical precedent advocating constitutional protection of that right; it
was this part of Justice Scalia's plurality opinion with which Justice O'Connor disagreed. Id
at 2346-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see infra text accompanying notes 190-93.
187. Id. at 2342.
188. Id. at 2345.
189. Id. Justice Scalia asserted that, although the unwed father may, under some circum-
stances, have a protected interest in maintaining a relationship with his child, "the absence of a
legal tie with the mother may in such circumstances appropriately place a limit on whatever
substantive constitutional claims might otherwise exist." Id (quoting Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979)).
190. 109 S. Ct. at 2346 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 2344 n.6 (plurality opinion).
192. Id.
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Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at
levels of generality that might not be 'the most specific level' available,"'
193
implying that this method of analysis is riddled with potential
inconsistencies.
B. The Dissents' Endorsement of Michael H. 's Due Process Claims
Against the Marital Presumption
1. Procedural Due Process
Dissenting, Justice Brennan criticized the plurality's disposition of
Michael H.'s procedural due process claim. Justice Brennan argued that the
court's refusal to grant an unwed father a hearing to prove paternity and to
demonstrate the merits of his claim violates his procedural due process
rights.' 94 Further, Justice Brennan criticized the plurality's method of ana-
lyzing the irrebuttable marital presumption issue. Specifically, Justice Bren-
nan maintained that the plurality's method of analysis ignored the purpose
of procedural due process.195 While the Scalia plurality opinion disposed of
the procedural due process argument by relying solely on considerations of
social policy, 196 Justice Brennan emphasized that the object of due process is
to allow a litigant an opportunity to prevail, not to ensure a specific out-
come.' 9 7 Therefore, Justice Brennan asserted that, although the plurality
chose to analyze the case in terms of substantive due process, the working of
California Evidence Code section 621 denied Michael H. the opportunity for
hearing on his claim of paternity, and therefore the Court should properly
have analyzed the case under procedural due process.' 98
2. Substantive Due Process
Justice Brennan criticized the plurality's disposition of Michael H.'s sub-
stantive due process claim, asserting that the plurality's method of defining
193. Id. at 2346 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 2357-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
195. Justice Brennan stated that, in its analysis, "the plurality tum[ed] procedural due
process upside down." Id. at 2354.
196. Id. at 2340-41 (plurality opinion).
197. Id. at 2354-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198. Id. Justice Brennan pointed out that "[five] justices agree that the flaw inhering in a
conclusive presumption that terminates a constitutionally protected interest without any hear-
ing whatsoever is a procedural one." Id. at 2349 (emphasis in original). This argument is
predicated on the existence of a constitutionally protected interest at the outset. This is pre-
cisely the reason that Justice Brennan advocated addressing the substantive due process claim
before considering the procedural due process claim, criticizing the plurality's method of "in-
voking substantive due process before ... consider[ing] the nature of the interest at stake." Id.
at 2358 (emphasis in original).
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the unwed father's interest at its most specific level would have led to differ-
ent results in prior cases. 99 Justice Brennan noted, for example, that con-
traceptive use, by married or unmarried couples, was never a traditionally
protected interest.20 0 Had the Court attempted to identify the interest in
prior cases with such specificity, Justice Brennan concluded, these interests
would have remained unprotected.2 °1 Therefore, Justice Brennan rejected
the plurality's "misguided"2"2 approach, and advocated defining Michael
H.'s interest on a less specific level, focusing on the parent-child relationship
rather than the relationship between an unwed father and a child adulter-
ously conceived.20 3
Justice Brennan recommended reexamining the rationale behind the
courts' traditional refusal to recognize an interest in a parent-child relation-
ship between an unwed father and his natural child, and suggested that a
rule denying the asserted interest may have outlived its foundations.' 4 In
particular, Justice Brennan advocated linking the biological connection be-
tween an unwed father and his child with the Court's substantial relation-
ship test to weigh against any counterclaims asserted by the state on behalf
of the child's mother or her husband seeking to terminate the unwed father-
child relationship. 205 Justice Brennan pointed to the unifying theme of prior
cases, including Stanley v. Illinois2° and Lehr v. Robertson,2"7 which advo-
cated the use of the substantial relationship test, and noted that Michael H.
met the criteria for establishing such a relationship with Victoria D.2°s In
this way, Justice Brennan concluded that the state could not have an interest
199. Id at 2350.
200. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965)).
201. Justice Brennan also cited "the freedom from an arbitrary transfer from a prison to a
psychiatric institution," in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), "the freedom from corporal
punishment in schools," in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), "and even the right to
raise one's natural but illegitimate children," in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) as
interests not "traditionally protected by our society." 109 S. Ct. at 2350 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2341 (plurality opinion)).
202. Id. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 2350-51.
204. Id at 2351.
In the plurality's constitutional universe, we may not take notice of the fact that the
original reasons for the conclusive presumption of paternity are out of place in a
world in which blood tests can prove virtually beyond a shadow of a doubt who sired
a particular child and in which the fact of illegitimacy no longer plays the burden-
some and stigmatizing role it once did.
205. Id at 2352-54.
206. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
207. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
208. 109 S. Ct. at 2352 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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so powerful that it justified terminating Michael H.'s interest in continuing
his relationship with Victoria D. without so much as a hearing.2"9
Similarly, Justice White, in his dissent, advocated applying the interpre-
tive substantial relationship approach used by the Court in previous cases to
determine the extent of an unwed father's rights.2"' Justice White criticized
the plurality's approach, arguing that a substantial relationship between a
natural father and his child merits constitutional protection regardless of the
father's marital status.2" Justice White favored examining the relationship
between the natural father and the child rather than the relationship between
the natural father and the mother.21 2 He noted that, due to divorce and
remarriage, children commonly maintain a relationship with a biological
parent while living with another parent; Justice White therefore rejected the
plurality's contention that discontinuing Michael H.'s relationship with Vic-
toria D. would further Victoria D.'s best interests.213
Focusing on the substantial relationship test, Justice White concluded that
Michael H. established a substantial relationship and was, as a result, enti-
tled to maintain it.214 Justice White advocated combining the substantial
relationship test with a decreased weighting of countervailing state interests
to reflect more accurately society's present concerns, as the best test for de-
termining whether the unwed father has a protected interest in maintaining a
relationship with his child.215 Justice White asserted that societal changes
and technological advances in blood testing render protection of a child from
the stigma of illegitimacy an outdated concern.216 Giving credence to the
state's interest in preserving the marital relationship between Gerald D. and
Carole D., Justice White admitted that allowing outsiders to claim paternity
of children born into a marriage could disturb the marital harmony.217 Jus-
tice White pointed out, however, that statutes preventing unwed fathers
from obtaining parental rights in no way prevent unwed fathers from assert-
209. Ii at 2358.
210. Id at 2360-61 (White, J., dissenting). Although Justice White disagreed with the ma-
jority's requirement of a substantial relationship in Lehr, he determined that Michael H. had
clearly satisfied that standard and thus had a protected liberty interest in his relationship with
Victoria D. Id. at 2360-61 & n.1.
211. d at 2360.
212. Id. at 2361.
213. Id. at 2362.
214. Id at 2361.
215. Id at 2360-62.
216. Id at 2362.
217. Id
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ing the claim of paternity, and thus an unwed father can easily disturb a
couple's marital harmony in spite of these statutes.
218
IV. THE UNITARY FAMILY TEST: A NEW JUDICIAL PATERNITY TEST
While the Court's decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D. extended the trend
of deciding cases concerning biological fathers' rights on unique factual ba-
ses,219 the Court added a further dimension. While in previous cases the
Court acknowledged the right of a biological father to continue a substan-
tially developed relationship with his child, in this case the plurality declined
to recognize the substantial relationship as a constitutionally protected
right.22 The Court upheld a law that not only denies a biological father
parental rights if he is not married to his children's mother, but also denies
him the right to present medical proof that he is their biological father in
order to obtain parental rights.
221
Prior to deciding Michael H., the Court, in Lehr v. Robertson,222 exten-
sively discussed the scope of an unwed father's interest in maintaining a rela-
tionship with his child. In Lehr the Court underscored the difference
between a mere biological connection and a developed commitment to per-
sonal contact between a natural father and his child. 223 The Lehr Court,
following the precedents set forth in Caban v. Mohammed,224 Quilloin v.
Walcott, 22' and Stanley v. Illinois, 226 relied upon the substantial relationship
test as a determinative factor in realizing the extent of protection afforded an
unwed father claiming a right to 'maintain a relationship with his child.227
Yet, surprisingly, Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald
D., ceased to employ the substantial relationship test in a determinative
way.228 Instead, the Court circumscribed the test's application by defining
218. Id. Presumably, the harmony in a marriage is already disturbed upon the occurrence
of an extramarital affair. Id The Court is in reality attempting to protect the appearance of
marital harmony in such a case. Id.
219. Id at 2345 (plurality opinion).
220. Id.
221. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
222. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
223. Id at 261-62.
224. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
225. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
226. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
227. 463 U.S. at 258-61.
228. 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2342 (1989). Justice Scalia stated:
establishing that a liberty interest is created by biological fatherhood plus an estab-
lished parental relationship-factors that exist in the present case as well ... distorts
the rationale of [prior] cases. [Those cases] rest not upon such isolated factors but
upon the historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term-tradi-
tionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family.
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the interest previously protected as turning on the establishment of a "uni-
tary family" by the natural father, mother, and child.229 In doing so, the
plurality effectively redefined the "substantial relationship" test and thereby
created a "unitary family" test. While the Court went on to broaden its
definition of the unitary family to "household[s] of unmarried parents and
their children," the Court refused to extend this definition to include an
adulterous relationship.
230
By limiting the substantial relationship test to a unitary family test, the
plurality redefined the critical issue in Michael H. v. Gerald D. Rather than
asking to what extent the Constitution affords protection to an unwed fa-
ther's asserted rights in maintaining a relationship with his child, the Court
asked whether courts traditionally had interpreted the Constitution to pro-
tect the relationship between an adulterous natural father and his child. 231
With the issue defined as such, the Court, exercising judicial restraint, de-
clined to recognize the creation of this newly defined constitutional right,
arguing that previous case law addressing the right to protect the relation-
ship between an unwed father and his adulterously conceived child did not
recognize such a right.232
Consistent with the Court's redefinition of the interest at stake, Justice
Scalia advocated analyzing "the most specific level at which a relevant tradi-
tion protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identi-
fied."'233 Justice Scalia reconciled the Court's decision in Michael H. with
contrary Supreme Court decisions by specifying Michael H.'s right to main-
tain his relationship with Victoria D. in this narrowed, exacting fashion.234
Rather than characterizing the relevant interest in terms of "parenthood,"
Justice Scalia insisted on adhering to a more specific level of characteriza-
tion, the "natural father's rights vis-a-vis a child whose mother is married to
Id. at 2342.
229. Id. at 2342 & n.3.
230. Id. n.3.
231. Id. at 2342.
232. Id. at 2343. The Supreme Court had never before confronted a case involving the
marital presumption. Lower courts, however, had struggled with the issue. See, e.g., Vincent
B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619, 627-28, 179 Cal. Rptr. 9, 13 (1981) (denying visitation
rights to an unwed father of a child born into a preexisting marriage), appeal dismissed 459
U.S. 807 (1982). But see Finnerty v. Boyett, 469 So. 2d 287, 296 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing
an unwed father a right of action to prove his paternity of a child born into a marital family for
the purpose of gaining visitation rights); Raleigh v. Watkins, 97 Mich. App. 258, 264-65, 293
N.W.2d 789, 792 (1980) (granting visitation rights to the unwed father of a child born during
the marriage of the mother to another man).
233. 109 S. Ct. at 2344 n.6.
234. Id. at 2342-46.
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another man." '2 35 In doing so, Justice Scalia left the substantial relationship
analysis intact, yet resolved the case against Michael H. in spite of Michael
H.'s substantial relationship with Victoria D.
Admittedly, the integrity of the marital family should properly play an
important role in determining the extent of an unwed father's parental
rights. The Michael H. Court, however, allowed the California legislature to
magnify that role, despite contrary scientific fact, by giving "categorical pref-
erence" to an existant marital family through the operation of the marital
presumption. 236 The justification behind marital presumption statutes has
shifted because of the advent of reliable paternity testing, and now focuses
on family integrity rather than the impossibility of proving paternity. 237 The
change in the rationale behind the law has resulted in a change in the
Court's method of analyzing cases involving unwed fathers' parental rights,
and this change leaves increasing numbers of unwed fathers2 38 questioning
their legal status as parents.23 9
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court, in its Michael H. v. Gerald D. plurality
decision, upheld a statute that was written by the California state legislature
at a time when medical science was unable to determine paternity through
blood testing. In doing so, the Court relied on traditional values of family
harmony and domestic tranquility, while modifying the Court's previous ap-
proach to determining the extent of an unwed father's parental rights.
Rather than extending the trend of utilizing the substantial relationship test,
which examines the nature of the relationship between the unwed father and
his child, and the best interests of the child standard, the plurality defined a
new "unitary family" test, and reasoned that, based on the facts of the case,
the plaintiff, an unwed father, did not fall into this category. Exercising judi-
cial restraint, the plurality refused to recognize a protected interest in the
235. Id at 2344 n.6.
236. Id at 2345.
237. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Stephen & Sharyne B., 124 Cal. App. 3d 524, 528-31, 177
Cal. Rptr. 429, 431-33 (1981).
238. "Clearly, there is an expanding population of unwed men who wish to play a role in
the upbringing of their children." UNIF. PUTATIVE AND UNKNOWN FATHERs AcT, 9B
U.L.A. 22, 23 (Supp. 1990).
239. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the
Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act in 1988 in an attempt to clarify some of the
questions raised by courts and unwed fathers with regard to the extent of unwed fathers' pa-
rental rights. Because no states have yet adopted the Act, prediction of its impact on the legal
status of unwed fathers would be premature. See id.
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tightly defined relationship between an unwed father and his adulterously
conceived child.
In examining the competing interests of the unwed father and the State,
the Court emphasized the integrity of the family unit with respect to the
married couple and the child, but ignored the integrity of the developed rela-
tionship with respect to the unmarried natural parent and the child. Rather
than examining the right of the unwed biological father to maintain a rela-
tionship with his child based on past interaction, the Court focused myopi-
cally on the future implications of such a relationship. In its decision in
Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Court overlooked an opportunity to clarify the
guidelines for identifying the protected interest in the relationship between
an unwed father and his child adhered to in former cases. Because the Court
has varied the method of analysis to fit the particular circumstances of each
case, the law leaves unwed fathers with no definitive rules to predict the
scope of their P1arental rights.
Joan C. Sylvain
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